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INTRODUCTION 
In their opposition brief, Defendants make two arguments for why they should be 
allowed to recover fees for their opposition to IKON's preliminary injunction motion 
(even though IKON's motion was denied and Defendants were never "wrongfully 
enjoined" by it). First, Defendants attempt to characterize their opposition to IKON's 
preliminary injunction motion as an effort to "dissolve" the TRO. This is factually 
incorrect since Defendants never filed a motion to dissolve the TRO. Also the TRO 
expired by its own terms and by operation of Rule 65A on the day in question without 
any action by Defendants. 
Second, Defendants argue in effect that this Court's "but for" rule for the recovery 
of fees under Rule 65A (recoverable fees limited to those that would not have been 
incurred "but for" the wrongful injunction) has no application to the instant case and 
should have no impact on the fees sought by Defendants. This argument is without merit 
and is contrary to this Court's decision in Tholen v. Sandy City. 489 P.2d 592 (Utah App. 
1993). Defendants' argument would also overturn the "American Rule," and allow a 
prevailing party to recover fees and costs whenever it prevails on a motion and without 
having been "wrongfully enjoined" by any order issued by the court. 
1 
ARGUMENT 
I. RULE 65A(c) DOES NOT OVERTURN THE AMERICAN RULE, 
BUT LIMITS RECOVERABLE DAMAGES AND FEES TO THOSE 
CAUSED BY THE OPERATION OF A WRONGFULLY ISSUED 
INJUNCTIVE ORDER. 
Rule 65A(c) does not overturn the American Rule. Rather, it merely provides that 
where a party has been "wrongfully enjoined/5 the party may recover those damages and 
fees directly related to the injunctive order that was wrongfully issued. The Rule is 
designed to ensure that a wrongfully enjoined party may recover those "costs, attorneys 
fees or damage [incurred] as the result of any wrongful order or injunction." Utah R. Civ. 
P. 65A(c). The Advisory Committee Note explains that paragraph (c) of the Rule is 
intended to protect parties when they "suffer expense or damages from a wrongful 
temporary restraining order or preliminary injunction." Utah R. Civ. P. 65A Advisory 
Committee Note. 
This Court has ruled that only those damages and fees "that arise from the 
operation of the [wrongfully issued] injunction [or restraining order] itself may be 
awarded under Rule 65A. Beard v. Dugdale. 741 P.2d 968, 969 (Utah App. 1987) 
(emphasis added). Recently this Court reiterated that a "party is entitled only those 
attorney fees incurred because of 'the application for, and issuance of, the [wrongful] 
injunction."' Miller v. Martineau & Co.. C.P.A.. 983 P.2d 1107, 1116 (Utah App. 1999) 
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(quoting Tholen v. Sandy City, 849 P.2d at 597) (emphasis added). Recoverable fees are 
only those incurred "in resisting the injunctive relief wrongfully entered against [a 
party]." Miller, 983 P.2d at 1116 (emphasis added). See also Saunders v. Sharp. 793 
P.2d 927, 933 (Utah App. 1990) (only fees "attributable to resisting the [wrongfully 
issued] injunction" recoverable under Rule 65A). 
Where the enjoined party actually moves to dissolve the wrongful injunctive order 
and prevails, it may recover those "fees directly related to dissolution of the wrongful 
injunction." Saunders. 793 P.2d at 933 (citing Artistic Hairdressers. Inc. v. Lew. 486 
P.2d 482, 484 (Nev. 1971)). The facts of Artistic Hairdressers illustrate what is required 
to recover fees on the basis of dissolving a wrongful order. In Artistic Hairdressers, a 
TRO was entered and three days later the defendants "moved . . . to dissolve the 
temporary restraining order." The court granted the defendants' motion and ordered the 
dissolution of the TRO. 486 P.2d at 483-84. The Nevada Supreme Court upheld the trial 
court's award of fees based on the defendants' motion to dissolve the TRO. In doing so, 
the Nevada Supreme Court expressly held that "only" those fees "directly related" to the 
defendants' motion to dissolve were recoverable. Id. at 484. The Court further explained 
that if a defendant chooses not to seek the dissolution of the wrongful TRO, but pursues a 
different strategy, such as opposing a subsequent motion for additional injunctive relief, it 
3 
cannot recover those subsequent fees because they would not be incurred in resisting a 
wrongful injunctive order. 
If the defendant, instead of attempting to remove the 
temporary injunction, seeks rather to prevent the issuance of a 
permanent injunction, or directs his efforts to defeating the 
action of the plaintiff, the expense of counsel fees thus 
incurred is an incident of the suit, and is not recoverable as 
damages sustained by reason of the [wrongful] injunction. 
Id. at 485 (citation omitted). 
In the instant case, Defendants did not move to dissolve the TRO. Instead, they 
opposed IKON's motion for a preliminary injunction and were successful. Rule 65A 
does not permit recovery of such fees because they are unrelated to the TRO and because 
Defendants were not "wrongfully enjoined" by an injunction that was never issued. 
That Rule 65A does not overturn the American Rule is confirmed by this Court's 
"but for" standard for recovery of fees. In Tholen v. Sandy City, this Court explained that 
a party "is entitled only to those attorney fees which would not have been incurred but for 
the application for, and issuance of, the preliminary injunction." In contrast, "[f]ees 
which would have been incurred anyway [in litigating the case] are not recoverable under 
Rule 65 A." 849 P.2d at 597 (emphasis in original). If fees could be recovered when they 
were not solely the result of a wrongfully issued injunctive order, fees would be 
recoverable for ordinary litigation expenses and the American Rule would be overturned. 
327076.2 
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Only those extra or additional fees that would not have been incurred "but for" the 
issuance of the wrongful injunctive order may be recovered. In the instant case, the fees 
incurred by Defendants for conferring with counsel, doing legal research, 
taking/defending depositions, etc. are ordinary expenses incurred in every case. 
Additionally, because a preliminary injunction is separate and apart from a TRO (and 
because IKON sought a preliminary injunction in addition to a TRO), fees incurred by 
Defendants in opposing IKON's preliminary injunction motion cannot be attributed to the 
TRO. (Defendants' opposition to IKON's preliminary injunction motion was not a 
vehicle for ending the TRO since the TRO lasted its full duration and Defendants did not 
move to dissolve it.) Thus, the fees incurred by Defendants in opposing IKON's 
preliminary injunction motion are not recoverable for two reasons: they were not incurred 
in connection with the TRO that "wrongfully" restrained Defendants, and they were 
ordinary litigation expenses "which would have been incurred anyway." The American 
Rule would be overturned if Rule 65A were allowed to be used to recover fees on the 
basis of a motion for injunctive relief that is never granted or to recover fees that do not 
meet the "but for" standard. 
In sum, the language of Rule 65A, the Advisory Committee Note, and the 
decisions of this Court make clear that Rule 65A does not permit recovery of fees 
5 
incurred in successfully opposing a motion for injunctive relief that is never issued by a 
court. Accordingly, the "substantial attorneys' fees and costs" claimed by Defendants in 
the instant case on the basis of their successfully "resisting IKON's Motion for a 
Preliminary Injunction" are not recoverable under Rule 65A. (Defendants' memorandum 
to the trial court quoted in Brief of Appellant at 7.) 
II. DEFENDANTS ARE NOT ENTITLED TO FEES ON THE THEORY 
THAT THEY "DISSOLVED" THE TRO. 
The TRO was initially issued for ten days and was later extended for an additional 
ten days by stipulation of the parties.1 The extended TRO, by its own terms, came to an 
end on July 9, 1997. See Exhibits B and C to Brief of Appellant. Defendants never filed 
a motion to dissolve the TRO. Rather, IKON filed a Motion for a Preliminary Injunction, 
and on July 9, 1997 the trial court held a hearing on IKON's motion: 
IKON's Motion for a Preliminary Injunction was heard by the 
Court on July 9, 1997, pursuant to IKON's Motion for 
Preliminary Injunction against the Defendants. 
Exhibit B to Brief of Appellees at 2. At the end of a fiill-day evidentiary hearing, the trial 
court granted Defendants' Motion for a Directed Verdict, finding that IKON had not 
satisfied the requirements for a preliminary injunction. Id. ("The Court . . . granted 
* The fact that Defendants stipulated to the extension of the TRO is significant in that it 
shows that Defendants did not seek to dissolve the TRO, as they now claim. 
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Defendants' Motion for a Directed Verdict and ruled that IKON had not met its burden of 
proving the elements of Rule 65A(e)"). 
Defendants argue that they incurred fees in seeking to dissolve the TRO. Brief of 
Appellees at 8. Defendants' contention is contradicted by the record. First, the extended 
TRO ran its full duration through July 9, 1997. Second, Defendants did not file a motion 
to dissolve the TRO. Third, the hearing held on July 9, 1997 was solely for the purpose 
of considering IKON's Motion for a Preliminary Injunction. Exhibit B to Brief of 
Appellees at 2. 
Defendants attempt to escape from the above facts by claiming that at the end of 
the "full-day evidentiary hearing on July 9, 1997" (when the TRO came to an end by its 
own terms), they moved for a dissolution of the TRO. Brief of Appellees at 8, 11. This is 
incorrect. Defendants cite to pages 428 and 454 of the Record (not attached to the Brief 
of Appellees) which do not support their claim. Page 428 (Minute Entry) merely states 
that Defendants sought a directed verdict on IKON's preliminary injunction motion. 
Page 454 is the second page of the court's Order Denying Plaintiffs Motion for 
Preliminary Injunction and Granting Defendants' Motion for Directed Verdict, and states: 
"Upon completion of IKON's presentation of its evidence, Defendants moved for a 
Directed Verdict..." See Exhibits A and B hereto. Additionally, the court's Findings of 
7 
Fact state that Defendants moved for a directed verdict on IKON's preliminary injunction 
motion, not for dissolution of the TRO. Exhibit B to Brief of Appellees at 2. While the 
court's order did dissolve the TRO, that was surplussage given that the TRO ended on 
that day by its own terms and by operation of Rule 65 A. In any case, the court did not 
dissolve the TRO due to any motion to dissolve it because no such motion was filed by 
Defendants. 
Defendants also try to recharacterize their opposition to IKON's preliminary 
injunction motion as an effort to dissolve the TRO by arguing that if IKON's preliminary 
injunction motion had been granted "it is safe to say that Judge Stirba would have 
continued the TRO." Brief of Appellees at 16. This argument is obviously incorrect. 
IKON did not seek a continuation of the TRO. Moreover, Judge Stirba could not have 
continued the TRO because Rule 65A would not have permitted such continuation. The 
TRO had already been issued for a ten-day period and extended for an additional period. 
It could not be extended further by the Court. Rule 65A states that a TRO "shall expire 
by its own terms within such time after entry, not to exceed ten days, as the court fixes, 
unless within the time so fixed the order. . . is extended for a like period or unless the 
[restrained] party . . . consents that it may be extended for a longer period." Utah R. Civ. 
P. 65A(b)(2). The Rule allows a court to extend a TRO one time so long as it does so 
327076.2 
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"within the time so fixed/' i.e., within the original period of the TRO. The Rule c-n 
give a court authority to extend a TRO a second Mine on* v n has * * ^ • 
either of the two ways uiuudnl In iii ihr l-'nli 
Defendants finally argue that this Court ruled in Beard v. Dugdale that fees may be 
awarded for opposition to a preliminary injunction motion even when the motion is not 
granted. Brief of Appellees at 14 Defendants mischaracterize Beard, Nowti^it1 in tltc 
Beard decision is ihul ivrs .ivuiidnl In I IK* defendants for successfully 
resisting the iss preliminary injunction. 741 P.2d at 969. In Beard, the TRO 
was dissolved seven days after it was issued (presumably in response to a motion to 
dissolve) and the plaintiffs' request for a preliminary injunction was denied When I he 
defendants subsequently sought In leenvri diinin^es inn! tees, Hie plaintiffs argued that 
ihev attorneys' fees." Id, (emphasis in original). The court 
disagreed and awarded an amount of fees, but the published decision does not indicate the 
basis or scope of the fees, beyond stating the general rule that recoverable damages and 
fees are limited tn "those th:ii in**'1 ln»»n Ihe operation ol the injunction itself." Id. 
mittphasis iidduli In Jim I, beard does not stand for the proposition that fees may be 
recovered under Rule 65A for opposing a preliminary injunction motion that is never 
granted. 
-* 
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Defendants' position, were it accepted, would have a chilling effect on the conduct 
of litigation. Parties would be penalized for seeking injunctive relief because they would 
owe fees and costs even if the requested relief were denied. Currently, under Rule 65 A, a 
party obtaining a wrongful injunction is responsible for those damages and fees that are 
caused by its conduct. Under Defendants' theory, a party would be liable for fees and 
costs even if its request for injunctive relief were denied and it did not wrongfully enjoin 
anyone.2 If a party may recover fees and costs on the basis of its successful opposition to 
injunctive relief that is never granted, few parties will risk seeking injunctive relief. Rule 
65A was not intended to curtail judicial remedies in this way. 
There is no basis in the law or the facts for Defendants to recover attorneys' fees 
based on their successfully "resisting IKON's Motion for a Preliminary Injunction" 
(Defendants' memorandum to the trial court quoted in Brief of Appellant at 7). 
^ Additionally, under Defendants' theory they could recover fees and costs for 
successfully opposing a preliminary injunction motion even where a TRO had never been 
granted or requested. Such is not the law. Regardless of whether or not a TRO was in 
place, Defendants would have done the same work and incurred the same fees in 
opposing IKON's preliminary injunctive motion. Given that IKON's motion was denied 
and given that even Defendants admit where an injunctive "order is never issued, there 
has been no wrongful restraint or injunction [on] which an award of attorneys' fees and 
costs could be awarded," the mere fact that a prior TRO had been issued creates no basis 
for recovery of fees and costs for Defendants' opposition to IKON's preliminary 
injunction motion. (Defendants quoted in Brief of Appellant at 13.) 
327076.2 10 
Defendants were never "wrongfully enjoined" by a preliminary injunction because tf i r 
never granted. Defendants5 claim to have incurred Ices in :in eflort to "dissolve" the TRO 
is withuiit merit because Defendants never filed a motion to dissolve the TRO and the 
TRO remained in effect for its full, extended duration. 
III. DEFENDANTS DO NOT SATISFY THIS COURT'S "Bl I 1 OR" 
STANDARD FOR RECOVERY OF FEES. 
Any tf , inan\ ml Itr^ wider Rule 65A must satisfy this Court's "but for" standard. 
Defendants make no attempt to satisfy this standard (nor did they at the trial court), but 
instead argue in essence that the standard should not apply to the instant case I "R lusis 
of Defendants' position is simply that they wi nld not l»c ;ir>lc to ircovei all the fees they 
seek if the standard wrrr applied Brief of Appellees at 18. Because much of the fees at 
issue were incurred in the ordinary way of litigation, Defendants fear that they will not be 
awarded all their fees if they have to satisfy the "but for" standard. Defendants' feai that 
the outcome would not be favorable tn diem ii, n *( a let'iliiiiate basis loi disregarding the 
"but for" standard fnr (he ra oven- at fees. 
Because Rule 65A is not intended to overturn the American Rule, it does not allow 
for the recovery of fees that would have been incurred "anyway " This ( outf lias 
explained: 
Although Rule 65A justifies awarding attorney fees Lo 
wrongfully enjoined parties, those parties are only entitled to 
11 
fees . . . incurred in defending against wrongfully obtained 
injunctive relief and not to fees incurred in litigating the 
underlying lawsuit associated with an injunction Fees 
which would have been incurred anyway, in the course of 
proving [the defendant's] entitlement to judgment and 
refuting [the plaintiffs arguments], are not recoverable under 
Rule 65A. 
Tholen. 849 P.2d at 597. To the extent that fees would have been incurred regardless of 
the TRO, they are not recoverable under Rule 65 A because they do not constitute an extra 
expense caused by a wrongful injunctive order. Therefore, there is no justification for an 
award of fees. Defendants argue that Rule 65A would be rendered meaningless if they 
were not allowed to recover all the fees they request, including fees incurred in opposing 
a motion that was never granted. Such is not the case. Clearly, Defendants are entitled to 
those fees they incurred in resisting the TRO.3 Likewise, if the trial court had wrongfully 
granted IKON a preliminary injunction, Defendants would be entitled to those fees 
incurred in opposing the wrongful preliminary injunction. 
Apparently because they recognize that they cannot satisfy the "but for" standard, 
Defendants cite to Idaho law, which differs from Utah law on this point. See Brief of 
Appellees at 19. Idaho law has no application to the instant case. Moreover, even under 
327076 2 
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Idaho law the recovery Defendants seek is only available where the fees were incurred In 
dissolving a [wrongful] restraining order." Durrant v. Chnstensth, - 4 o / 
(Idaho 1W01 Bcciiust lis expLmul above, Defendants did not dissolve or seek to 
dissolve tin TRO, Idaho law is as unavailing to Defendants as is Utah law. 
CONCLUSION 
For the foregoing reasons and for the reasons stated in IK1" >N \s opening b? id ftii 
trial court's Order Granting J ^tcniln^' Renewed Molion for Award of Attorneys' Fees 
and Costs should be reversed. The matter should be remanded to the trial court for an 
award of fees and costs limited to those incurred by Defendants in connection with the 
TRO, excluding those fees and costs incurred by Defendants in opposing IK'(DM "is. mm ion 
for a preliminary injunction '''vddifioiicilh, Ihr ln.il in m l -Jui ii<! .ippls the "but for" 
star f fees and costs under Rule 65A. 
3 In light of Miller v. Martineau, IKON does not dispute that Defendants are entitled to 
recover fees and costs incurred in connection with the TRO, including its stipulated 
extension. 
iinn-ia *> 
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DEREK LANGTC 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that on thig^ffi(day of March, 2000, 1 cuised to he mailed, first 
class, postage prepaid i^ e inn ,inil t <>nn i u»pi»^ of the foregoing REPLY BRIEF OF 
APPELLANT 
J. Michael Hansen 
NELSON, CHIPMAN, QUIGLEY & HANSEN 
Attorneys for Uinta Business Systems, Inc. 
215 South State Street, Suite 800 
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Tab A 
THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
IKON" OFFICE SOLUTIONS, INC. , 
P l a i n t i f f , 
vs . 
DAVID CROOK, e t a l , 
Defendant. 
MINUTE ENTRY 
Case No. 970904077CV 
Honorable ANNE M. STIRBA 
Court Clerk: Marcy Thorne 
Reporter: VIDEO 8:33 AM 
July 9, 1997 
Plaintiff's Counsel: 
Defendant's Counsel; 
Derek Langton/W. Mark Gavre 
J. Michael Hansen/Claudia Berry/David Cutt 
The above-entitled case comes before the Court for evidentiary 
hearing on the motion for preliminary injunction. The appearances 
are as shown above. The Court hears opening statements from 
respective counsel(8:34). Plaintiff calls Patricia Peas (9:00), 
Robert Petersen (10:15), Jeff Hill (10:30), Joseph Weis (10:55), 
David Crook (11:40), Jan Warner (1:35) and David Turner (1-35)
 Vho 
are sworn, their direct testimony is proffered by counsel and they 
sore cross examined. Exhibits are offered and received. Depositon 
of Joseph Weis and David Crook are published. Plaintiff rests 
(2:00) 
Defendant motions for directed verdict which is argued tn Uu 
and submitted. 
Based on the testimonies, evidence, and arguments of counsex, 
the Court grants defendant's motion for directed verdict. The 
temporary restraining order is dismissed. Counsel for defendants 
are instructed to prepare proposed findings of fact, conclusions of 
law and order consistent with the Courtfs ruling. 
TabB 
-ILtbuistniuibtmift 
Thirrt liiHirial District 
STTRMTTTKn BY: 
J. MICHAEL HANSEN, Esq. (#1339) 
CLAUDIA F. BERRY, Esq. (#5037) 
BLAKE D. MILLER, Esq. (#4070) 
of and for 
SUrTTERAXLAND 
175 South West Temple, Suite 700 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101-1480 
Telephone: (801)532-7300 
Attorneys for Defendants 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
IKON OFFICE SOLUTIONS, INC., an 
Ohio corporation, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
DAVID L. CROOK, an individual, 
DAVID TURNER, an individual, 
GINGER SEAMAN, an individual, 
ROBERT L. PETERSEN, an individual, 
MATTHEW HILL, an individual, 
JEFFREY R. HILL, an individual, 
NICHOLAS MADSEN, an individual, 
LOUISE MADSEN, an individual, 
CINDY COMPANA, an individual, 
JENNIFER R. MILLER, an individual, 
and UINTA BUSINESS SYSTEMS, 
INC., a Utah corporation, 
ORDER DENYING PLAINTIFF'S 
MOTION FOR PRELIMINARY 
INJUNCTION AND GRANTING 
DEFENDANTS' MOTION FOR 
DIRECTED VERDICT 
Civil No. 970904077 
Honorable Anne M. Stirba 
Defendants. 
The Motion of IKON Office Solutions, Inc. CKON") for a Preliminary Injunction, 
pursuant to Rule 65A, Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, was heard by the Court on July 9, 1997. 
IKON was represented by its counsel, Derek Langton, Esq. and W. Mark Gavre, Esq.. 
Defendants David L. Crook, David Turner, Ginger Seaman, Robert L. Petersen, Matthew 
Hill, Jeffrey R. Hill, Nicholas Madsen, Louise Madsen, Cindy Compaiia, Jennifer R. Miller 
and Uinta Business Systems, Inc. (collectively referred to as "Defendants") were represented 
by their counsel, J. Michael Hansen, Esq. and Claudia F. Berry, Esq. At the hearing, the 
Court heard the testimony of Patricia A. Pease, Robert L. Petersen, Jeffrey R. Hill, Joseph P. 
Weis, David L. Crook, Jann Warner and David Turner through proffers presented by counsel 
and by cross-examination. Upon completion of IKON's presentation of its evidence, 
Defendants moved for a Directed Verdict in accordance with Rule 50(a), Utah Rules of Civil 
Procedure. 
The Court, having considered all exhibits and testimony presented by IKON, having 
heard the arguments of counsel and being fully advised in the premises, and the Court having 
heretofore entered its Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, and based thereon and good 
cause appearing 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that Defendants' Motion for Directed Verdict is granted 
and IKON's Motion for a Preliminary Injunction is denied. The Temporary Restraining Order 
entered by the Court on June 18, 1997 is hereby dissolved. 
2 
DATED this ) P. ^ day of MJ-^j^/ t t_* §r 
BY THE COURT: 
1997. 
M. STIRBA 
District Judge 
APPROVED AS TO FORM: 
PARSONS BEHLE & LATIMER 
Derek Langton, Esq. 
W. Mark Gavre, Esq. 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
KON Office Solutions, Inc. 
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